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A commentary on
Neural responses to taxation and volun-
tary giving reveal motives for charitable
donations
by Harbaugh, W. T., Mayr, U., and
Burghart, D. R. (2007). Science 316,
1622–1625. doi: 10.1126/science.1140738
Altruism involves acting toward the wel-
fare of others by incurring costs to the
self (Batson and Shaw, 1991). The the-
oretical question is: Why would people
help others who are unrelated genetically?
This was considered a “large anomaly”
from rationality by neo-classical eco-
nomics (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) as
humans are assumed to be maximizers of
decision utility—a purely selfish “homo-
economicus” who should not spend on
unrelated others. However, money given
to the poor could create a private good
for the recipient but at the same time, it
creates a non-rival non-excludable bene-
fit (or utility) for all those citizens who
value a condition where poor people are
also well fed and can live a decent life
(Mayr et al., 2009). Thus, there could be
a “warm glow” (Andreoni, 1995) by giving
to charity (“impure altruism”).
Harbaugh et al. (2007) designed a novel
experiment which strikingly showed that
both mandatory and voluntary transfers
to charity show neural activity in the
brain areas associated with reward pro-
cessing with larger activations following
voluntary transfers. These results support
both pure and impure forms of altru-
ism. The brain areas implicated were
medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the
dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
along with the ventral striatum, nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) and the insulae which
form parts of the reward circuitry that
codes most real life rewards (like money,
drugs and chocolates). The authors later
argued that these results show donating to
charity is inherently rewarding and ratio-
nal (Mayr et al., 2009).
The reasoning adopted was: If brain
area B is involved in coding rewards which
have inherent utility and then we observe
area B is involved in donations, then there
is utility in donating and hence donating is
rational (see Mayr et al., 2009). Is this con-
clusion warranted from the current data?
This line of reasoning uses reverse
inference—a widespread but questionable
technique (Poldrack, 2006) in neuroeco-
nomics which infers mental states from
brain states. The conclusions could be
flawed under the assumptions of function-
alism as multiple brain states can map to
multiple mental states in a non-exclusive
manner (Levin and Aharon, 2011).
In fact, multiple studies highlight
the same brain areas implicated by
Harbaugh and colleagues for other cog-
nitive processes apart from donations. For
example, medial frontal and posterior cin-
gulate are also involved in moral decision
making (Greene et al., 2001) while ventral
OFC represent outcome values of primary
reinforcers and abstract rewards (Peters
and Büchel, 2010). Experienced utility and
predictive error involved in both mone-
tary and social reward tasks activate the
vMPFC and straitum (Lin et al., 2012). It
is now commonly accepted that generally
the vMPFC is involved in valuation and a
modulation of these signals is performed
in the DLPFCwhich is a seat of self-control
and emotion regulation (Hare et al., 2008).
Thus, even though I do not attempt to
provide a comprehensive review, it is obvi-
ous that the problem of inferring whether
donating is a rational act by observing
activations of the reward circuitry is not
easy. Note that in an experiment even if
a brain area (meso-limbic reward circuit)
is active for both monetary rewards and
donations (Moll et al., 2006), we cannot
conclude that donating is rewarding or
rational by itself or that there is a utility in
donating.
Part of the theoretical confusion is due
to multiple usages of “utility.” If one uses
the concept of decision utility based on
economical grounds, then charity might
seem irrational (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003). However, if one uses the hedonic
form where utility stems frommaximizing
pleasures for oneself (“experienced util-
ity”; Kahneman et al., 1997) then both
pure altruism and warm-glow could have
utility, since both maximize pleasures of
seeing somebody gain (pure altruism) or
of feeling good oneself (warm-glow).
The other important demonstration by
Harbaugh et al. (2007) was that neural
responses (in the reward circuit includ-
ing the NAcc) to pure charity gains after
subtracting responses to pure personal
gains predict the rate of accepting altruistic
transfers to some extent (27%). Whether
responding to gains to oneself and gains
to an organization neutrally code the same
process is not clear. Hence, what a subtrac-
tion between these two conditions means
is likewise not clear. As activations in the
NAcc can increase not only for antici-
pated gains, but also for anticipated losses
(Carter et al., 2009), it is possible that
activations for charity gains can also be
construed as personal losses. Also, note
that the prediction is constructed from six
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different brain regions (averaged together)
that in a way supposes that all these areas
encode value, but what kind of utility is
encoded and what computations are per-
formed? It is of course possible that mon-
etary gains to oneself and a charity are
both valuable because both increase expe-
rienced utility. Crucially, future studies
need to add more clarity about the moti-
vational relevance of monetary transfers,
definitions of utility being referred to and
associated pre-suppositions.
Further, in general, what is meant by
rational is often not explicit. If “ratio-
nal” is to desire more of “good things,”
it can be seen as experienced utility and
if we take the normative route, it is con-
fined to decision utility. But, is it epis-
temic or instrumental rationality? (Kelly,
2003). Even though rationality is taken as
a starting point in economic analysis it
is often not clear why that should be so
(Foley, 2004). In fact, Foley argues that this
supposes an imposition of modern capi-
talist social understanding which is sim-
ply one way society functions. Finally, if
moral requirements instigate donating to
social causes (Kant’s categorical impera-
tive; Johnson, 2012) or altruism is rational
in itself (Nagel, 1978), then doesn’t donat-
ing become rational by definition? These
questions require more work before mak-
ing convincing philosophical or theoretical
deductions related to the rational basis of
altruism.
I do not intend to suggest that the rea-
soning is wrong; but, conclusions from
neuroscientific works are often based
on many undisclosed assumptions and
incomplete ontology, which requires more
criticality to settle philosophical questions.
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